
(Originally posted here: https://twitter.com/JeffGreason/status/1860439949100896479?mx=2)
2025: A Moment Of Opportunity In Space by Jeff Greason
Since 1969, a ritual of American politics is the re-examination of American space policy with each change in the presidency. A panel, commission, or task group gives recommendations. New initiatives are announced—to be mostly forgotten. The focus often shifts from the Moon to Mars or vice versa. Very little of this results in lasting change. While it is often said that “personnel is policy,” and certainly, leadership (or its lack) matters enormously, changes to the structure of policy matter more. The structure of the bureaucracies that carry out space policy in the U.S. and the incentives with which they operate matter immensely.
We are now at a moment of tremendous opportunity in space. Years of wise policy, combined with good fortune and the ability of U.S. business leaders to raise the capital needed for private ventures, have placed the U.S. back in a leadership position. SpaceX dominates world launch markets, and competitors are rising to chase after them. This superior position will not last if the US makes unwise policy choices—as Heinlein wrote: “The laws of physics work as well for others as they do for us.”
Goals should drive policy choices, so what are our goals in space? We want the U.S. commercial space industry to continue to lead the world. We want it to provide the industrial base for our defense needs in space. We want to lead the setting of norms of international behavior in space—rules-based international order with relationships between nations that create mutual benefits. We want the U.S. to lead discoveries of natural resources and phenomena in space, and put them to economic use. We want U.S. citizens and U.S. companies to pioneer the space frontier, free to innovate, risk, and thrive—and free to fail when risks exceed our grasp.
Achieving these goals requires us to foster the development of markets for new commercial space ventures, remove regulatory barriers that slow the pace of development of U.S. space-related businesses, provide a predictable and supportive legal and regulatory framework, and enable the U.S. Space Force to ensure the freedom of navigation in space and protect our space assets.
Lasting solutions require more than wise administrators; we need wise policy that survives even in their absence.
Five executive orders
First, I recommend moving the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) out of the FAA. Give OCST back to the Secretary of Transportation, where it belongs by statute. Placed within FAA by an executive order by Clinton, it can be removed from FAA by executive order. Unfortunately, the Part 450 regulation of space launch and reentry was a step backward—the U.S. should return to a more performance-based regulatory structure. After decades in which every launch and launch site license has received a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), we should either seek a categorical exclusion, like we have for aircraft, or change to a “shall issue” structure where the government may deny a license application for cause, but, if it takes no action, the license is approved by default.
The experimental launch permit regime could have been used to cover Starship flights 1-5 with a single approval. If additional regulatory work is needed to revitalize the experimental permit regime, do it. Rather than adding staff to solve licensing backlog and delays, reduce the number of staff hours it takes per application by making greater use of existing authority to allow one application to cover multiple launches.
Second, a core tenet of U.S. space policy since Eisenhower is that space-based reconnaissance is a stabilizing capability, we thrive in open societies without secrecy , and taking pictures of the Earth is not a hostile act. As such, eliminate all licensing requirements for space-based imagery. No one should have to ask NOAA for permission to take pictures. If the commercial satellite imaging capabilities become as good or better than those of government satellites, we maintain access to the best imaging systems in the world. An executive order could direct NOAA to immediately approve all applications for Earth observation licensing, regardless of how good the imagery might be. Then, change the legislation so the requirement for licensing cannot be easily reinstated by a future administration.
Third, the U.S. space industry labors under tremendous disadvantages due to ITAR. The “technical assistance” category for ITAR control requires government review and approval for something as simple as describing a product on a website. Eliminate this category completely to restore freedom of speech to U.S. citizens—speaking about space capabilities is not a criminal act and attempts to make it so are unconstitutional. Note: This has nothing to do with keeping government secrets, which are governed by secrecy agreements, clearances, and the like. Instead, if companies want to talk about their products, or engineers in private industry want to talk about their work, let them. This is necessary to ensure the U.S. maintains a culture of technical leadership and finds markets for made-in-the-USA products. At a minimum, some kind of financial relationship needs to be in place before the U.S. government can claim speech constitutes “technical assistance.” An executive order could immediately redefine technical assistance to ensure the regulations do not infringe on free speech. Then, change the legislation.
Fourth, the FCC has expanded its own authority, making licenses for radio transmitters contingent on compliance with additional conditions imposed by the FCC that have nothing to do with managing the radio spectrum. The FCC’s domain should be to manage radio spectrum, not space debris or other aspects of what US commercial companies do in space. An executive order could eliminate this overreach immediately. And since the Supreme Court ended Chevron deference to such things, these rules are unlikely to return without congressional authorization.
Fifth, U.S. obligations under the Outer Space Treaty call for us to provide “authorization and continuing supervision” of our commercial space activities. Within the space industry, there is reasonable consensus that the Department of Commerce should take on this role, because a regulatory regime is not warranted yet. Instead, we need a mechanism for deconflicting potentially interfering uses. The Biden administration encouraged consultation among many agencies with none empowered to say “Yes.”
Pending legislation, an executive order could designate the Department of Commerce as the responsible agency for in-space commercial activities, just as Reagan made the Department of Transportation the responsible agency for commercial launch before the Commercial Space Launch Act codified it. Such an order must make clear that no permission is required from the government. Instead, the DoC would maintain a registry and check to confirm that a proposed activity doesn’t conflict with other registered activities or treaty compliance, such as no weapons of mass destruction. In the absence of a conflict, the activity is registered. When reviewing launch licenses, the Secretary of Transportation can check that the activity has been registered with DoC– that’s all that is needed. “Continuing supervision” can be maintained by requiring parties to update their registry when they change the nature of an activity. This process would create clarity for the space industry and provide the first steps towards a system of recognizing that entities operating on celestial bodies are entitled to do so, can expect to continue to do so, can transfer or sell their operations to others, and that others should not interfere with peaceful space activities.
All these measures have negligible impact on the federal budget.
NASA’s role
Other more challenging aspects in U.S. space policy have to do with NASA and are not free of cost. Since Kennedy’s redirection of NASA to go to the Moon in 1961 and the end of the Saturn V production in 1968-1970, we have struggled as a nation with the questions, “Why does the U.S. need a civilian space agency and what it is for?”
A detailed discussion of the purpose of civilian space agencies would be a much longer article, but in brief, the U.S. established NASA for three main reasons:
· To set the precedent for peaceful uses of space and be a leader so we can set norms of behavior. (In 1958, this was most urgently about creating the precedent that space reconnaissance and overflight of territory in space were peaceful uses.)
· Improve the technology for air and space vehicles to ensure that the U.S. industrial base was the most capable. (This was essentially a continuation, in space, of what the predecessor to NASA, the NACA, had done for aircraft.)
· Learn more about space, what is up there, and how we can benefit from it.
Kennedy repurposed NASA into a mission-conducting agency. NASA would conduct a high-profile, very expensive and complex mission—sending humans to the Moon and back—so as to forestall Soviet claims on the Moon and to ‘win’ the arena of perception of the U.S. as a leader in space.
Now, unfortunately, the mission-conducting elements of NASA for human spaceflight and space science missions consume the bulk of NASA’s budget. The original purpose—maturing technology to support the U.S industrial base—is underfunded. Human missions became ends in themselves, and a constituency in themselves, so that we pay for effort not results. Science missions also became their own constituency, conducted for the benefit of the science community alone—not to mature technology or to learn about the things in space from which we might derive economic benefits.
To forestall any claims by China, we have an urgent need to return humans to the Moon and on to Mars, and to support the peaceful use of space by like-minded nations, signatories to the Artemis Accords. A shift is needed from “pay for effort” to “pay for results.” To improve the performance of air and space vehicles, we need NASA to mature technologies, an activity that conflicts with its mission-conducting efforts. But, NASA’s technology development effort is focused on “technology needed for NASA missions,” and paradoxically, NASA missions are selected on the basis of “what can be done without any new technology.”
Either NASA mission selection and design needs to be subordinated to maturation of space technologies that benefit parties outside of NASA or the maturation of such technologies needs to be assigned to a new entity, funded and chartered for this purpose. If a new entity, note that the U.S. Space Force as well as U.S. industrial partners are likely customers for such technologies and should share in the development of roadmaps that describe the technologies that need maturation.
While it may be a step too far to reform NASA, the rest of these measures are policy changes, have negligible cost, and most can be commenced at once by executive order. The opportunities for accelerating U.S. efforts in space are greater than ever, and I hope the incoming Trump administration will take note of the opportunity.




































































































